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THE LONG ROAD TO REFORM: AN 
ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
REFORM IN VIETNAM 
NORMAN BROWN IV* 
Abstract: In the mid-I 980s, Vietnam opened its borders to international 
investment in hopes of improving its economic atmosphere. The 
Vietnamese government launched new initiatives and passed new laws 
to facilitate and encourage Foreign Direct Investment in its ailing 
economy. However, after an examination of recent changes, this Note 
concludes that further reform is still required in order to encourage the 
necessary Foreign Direct Investment that will help aid Vietnam's feeble 
economy and allow it to prosper as the next great Asian economic 
power. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mter the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, Vietnam isolated itself 
from countries existing outside the Soviet bloc.l In the 1980s, how-
ever, Vietnam once again opened its doors to the world and promised 
a reform that would create the largest investment opportunity for 
ambitious foreign investors since China.2 In 1986, Vietnam launched 
the doi moi, or restructuring, a governmental initiative aimed at im-
proving the country's ailing economic conditions.3 
During the decade following the unveiling of the doi moi, the 
Vietnamese government implemented very few changes or economic 
reforms.4 Prior to the most recent economic reforms implemented by 
the Vietnamese government, the doi moi was merely a rhetorical initia-
tive that resulted in little to no official action.5 Many foreign investors 
entered the Vietnamese economy with hopes of timely reform be-
cause the "large number of literate and entrepreneurial people, cou-
* Norman Brown IV is an Executive Editor for the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
I Goodnight, Vietnam, EcoNOMIST,jan. 8, 2000, at 65. 
2 Id. 
3 Pulling Teeth, EcONOMIST,july 29, 2000, at 71. 
4 See Goodnight, Vietnam, supra note 1, at 65. 
5 Id. 
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pled with Vietnam's close proximity to China," made Vietnam the 
perfect Asian niche economy.6 However, the inactivity of government 
reform caused most foreign investors to leave Vietnam.7 Furthermore, 
the entry of China into the World Trade Organization provided a lu-
crative oasis for foreign investors seeking a strong Asian presence.8 
The Asian crisis also cast doubt upon the wisdom of opening the 
Vietnamese markets to the West, causing the country to slow any on-
going reform that would have eased foreign entry into its markets.9 
Vietnamese leaders decided that stability and continuous communist 
governance was well worth the price of slower economic growth.10 
This decision allowed only slow and modest reform.ll Nevertheless, 
with growing world markets and the increased need for foreign in-
vestment, Vietnam soon had to revisit the doi moi.l2 
Part I of this Note provides a background of the doi moi. 
Specifically, Part I establishes a background of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI) and explains how the changes implemented by the Viet-
namese government will further FDI. Part II of this Note discusses the 
changes in the two major investment laws of Vietnam: Vietnam's For-
eign Investment Law and the Enterprise Law. It also demonstrates 
how the government is easing regulations in order to become more 
FDI friendly. Furthermore, Part II examines other factors that seek to 
encourage FDI in Vietnam, namely the Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(BIT) between Vietnam and the United States and the opening of a 
new Vietnamese Stock Exchange. Part III examines suggested reme-
dies to bring about economic reform and increase FDI. This Note 
concludes by stating that although the current reform is a step in the 
right direction for the establishment of strong FDI in Vietnam, the 
ultimate fate of FDI infiltration into the Vietnamese economy is con-
tingent on whether the Vietnamese government can see beyond its 
protectionist beliefs and fears that deregulation may lead to the fall of 
communism in Vietnam. 
6 Tuyen Quang, All Go Below, All Caution Above, EcoNOMIST,june 10,2000, at 48. 
7 Id. at48. 
8 Seeid. 
9 Goodnight, Vietnam, supra note 1, at 65. 
10 See id. 
11 Id. 
12 See generally Pulling Teeth, supra note 3, at 71-72. 
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I. BACKGROUND oF THE Do1 MOI 
A. Background on Foreign Direct Investment 
One of the primary objectives of the renewed doi moi efforts is to 
create an economic atmosphere that will attract more FDI to Viet-
nam.13 FDI is a term used to describe the process by which private 
business enterprises purchase capital assets, transfer capital, or rein-
vest profits into the economy of another country.14 FDI can improve 
an ailing economy substantially by yielding increases in the capital 
available for investment, revenues, and employment, and by introduc-
ing new skills and technologies into an economy.15 The existence of a 
sound economic and financial framework is vital to a country seeking 
foreign investment.16 Unfortunately, Vietnam's economic and 
financial framework remains "weak and underdeveloped."17 
Government attitudes play a crucial role in facilitating or dis-
couraging foreign investment, and to date, the Vietnamese govern-
ment has discouraged the infusion of capital.I8 The Vietnamese gov-
ernment has done virtually nothing to help clear the way for foreign 
investment and, in fact, has done much to hamper this investment.19 
A campaign against "social evils," established in 1996, discouraged 
many foreign investors by prohibiting them from placing foreign 
names on their shops.2° Furthermore, foreign companies were faced 
with burdensome tariffs that made production in Vietnam relatively 
expensive.21 3M, for example, faced a 40% duty tariff on "office prod-
ucts" rather than the less burdensome 10% duty placed on "adhesive 
backed paper. "22 
Such burdensome restrictions and red tape have caused many 
foreign enterprises to leave Vietnam.23 As a result, the Vietnamese 
13 Seeid. 
14 AJ. EASSON, TAXATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 2 (1999). 
15 IBRAHIM F.l. SHIHATA, LEGAL 'TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE WORLD 
BANK GuiDEUNES 11 (1993). 
16 /d. at 20. 
17 Country Forecast Vietnam September 2000 Main Report: Policy/Bus. Outlook: Financing, in 
THE EcoNOMIST INTELUGENCE UNIT LTD., Sept. 6, 2000, available at 2000 WL 23804920. 
[hereinafter Policy/Bus. Outlook]. 
18 SeeSHIHATA, supra note 15, at 22; see also Goodnight, Vietnam, supra note 1, at 65. 
19 See Goodnight, Vietnam, supra note 1, at 65. 
20 /d. 
21 /d. 
22 /d. 
23 Quang, supra note 6, at 48. 
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government realized that changes were needed to retain the remain-
ing foreign enterprises, and to aid the influx of other foreign enter-
prises in order to boost foreign investment in the Vietnamese econ-
omy.24 
B. &cent Doi Moi Initiatives 
Since 1999, the Vietnamese government has initiated a period of 
reform that seeks to aid the ailing Vietnamese economy by opening 
the country once again to foreign investment.25 It appears that Viet-
nam has tempered the fears of western influence with the more im-
portant need for a stronger global and domestic economy.26 Most of 
the economic reformation is geared at creating a more favorable at-
mosphere for foreign investors in the hopes of increasing FDI in 
Vietnam.27 The four major steps taken by the Vietnamese government 
to increase FDI were to: (1) amend the Law on Foreign Investment;28 
(2) create a new Enterprise Law to facilitate foreign business growth; 
(3) enter into a BIT with the United States; and 4) open a Vietnamese 
Stock Exchange.29 An analysis of these recent changes in Vietnamese 
law and regulations highlights the trend of reform aimed at imple-
menting the doi moi initiative.30 
II. CHANGES IN VIETNAMESE LAw 
A. Vietnam's Law on Foreign Investment 
The amended Law on Foreign Investment, effective July 1, 2000, 
aims to make Vietnam more attractive and friendly to FDI enter-
prises.31 The most important amendment grants foreign enterprises 
the right to mortgage their land-use rights.32 This power gives foreign 
enterprises the ability to borrow from foreign banks using the assets 
and property of their companies as collateral. 33 Previously, only Viet-
namese banks had the statutory authority to foreclose on land and 
24 See generally Pulling Teeth, supra note 3. 
25 See id. 
26 Quang, supra note 6, at 48. 
27 See Small Mercies, Bus. AsiA, Sept. 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 764729. 
28 See Pulling Teeth, supra note 3. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 Small Mercies, supra note 27. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
2002] Foreign Investment Reform in Vietnam 101 
property.34 This change is important to foreign firms that wish to in-
vest in the Vietnamese economy because it creates a new means of 
financing through which capital may be raised. 35 
The government also sought to aid FDI enterprises by passing 
amendments to the Law on Foreign Investment that: (1) allow the 
government to provide loan guarantees; (2) allow FDI enterprises to 
decide for themselves whether to set up reserve funds and to deter-
mine their size; (3) reduce the profit-remittance tax; ( 4) allow the 
remaining value of land-use rights contributed by the joint Vietnam-
ese business party to be subject to liquidation; and (5) allow FDI en-
terprises to determine for themselves the forms of their investments 
and the reorganization of their capital structures. 36 
Other amendments to the Law on Foreign Investment seek to 
minimize much of the red tape that burdens enterprises, such as gov-
ernmental restrictions and procedures that are more burdensome in 
Vietnam than in other foreign investment areas.37 For example, the 
statute no longer requires unanimous approval by the joint venture's 
management board for changes affecting the corporation, but rather, 
it merely requires consensus decision-making.38 Moreover, some cate-
gories of FDI enterprises, especially those that export over half of 
their production, no longer will be required to obtain investment li-
censes but will only be required to register the enterprise.39 Thus, pri-
vate firms do not have to secure "onerous government approvals" be-
fore they are able to invest legally as foreign companies in the 
Vietnamese market.40 An additional amendment allows enterprises to 
purchase foreign currencies from commercial banks to cover their 
current transactions.41 Finally, whereas in the past an enterprise usu-
ally bore the burden and expense of site work and obtaining land-use 
rights, it is now the responsibility of either the Vietnamese partner in 
the joint venture or the local people's committee to complete these 
tasks.42 While the FDI enterprises welcome these changes, many argue 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Small Mercies, supra note 27. 
37 See Nguyen Thang, Grant us a Clear Role, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REv.,June 26, 2000, 
available at http:/ /www.vir-vietnam.com/ 454vir I 454homOO.htm. 
38 Small Mercies, supra note 27. 
39 !d. 
40 Margot Cohen, A Glimmer of Hope, FAR E. EcoN. REv.,June 8, 2000, at 76. 
41 Small Mercies, supra note 27. 
42 Id. 
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that the changes are diluted and insubstantial,43 especially consider-
ing that only twenty-three of the seventy-five proposed amendments 
were passed.44 
Foreign investors view these changes as a positive step toward al-
leviating the day-to-day headaches faced by all foreign businesses in 
Vietnam.45 Furthermore, these changes help reduce the burdensome 
taxes that foreign investors must pay in order to maintain a presence 
in Vietnam.46 
B. The Enterprise Law 
Another change implemented by the Vietnamese government 
aimed at improving foreign investment was the enactment of the En-
terprise Law, which took effect on January 1, 2000.47 One of the En-
terprise Law's major effects is that it allows businesses to register with-
out waiting for government approval.46 During the four months 
following the Enterprise Law's enactment, registrations for private 
firms more than doubled compared to the same period in 1999.49 
This increase in registration stems from the reduced cost of register-
ing a new business from ten to thirty million Vietnamese dong (VND) 
to only VND 100,000.50 Moreover, businesses are able to receive their 
registrations in only one week, as opposed to the six months previ-
ously required. 51 
The Enterprise Law is a positive step toward job creation and 
streamlined regulations.52 As with the Law on Foreign lnvestment,53 
however, enterprises desire a far more sweeping change.54 For exam-
ple, while eighty-four licenses were removed, 300 such licenses still 
remain.55 Despite the fact that enterprises are enjoying the new-found 
freedom that the Enterprise Law gives them, due to its weak imple-
43 Cohen, supra note 40, at 76. 
44 Small Mercies, supra note 27. 
45 Id. 
46 Donars, Vietnamese Officials Review Economic Development, AsiAN EcoN. NEws, June 26, 
2000, available at 2000 WL 23765615. 
47 Cohen, supra note 40, at 76. 
48 !d. 
49 Id. 
50 Thang, supra note 37. 
5t Id. 
52 Cohen, supra note 40, at 76. 
53 See Small Mercies, supra note 27. 
54 See Cohen, supra note 40, at 76. 
55 !d. 
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mentation by Vietnamese officials, it alone does not create the eco-
nomic and regulatory atmosphere that FDI enterprises need to pros-
per.56 
C. The Bilateral Investment Treaties Between Vietnam and the United States 
In the growing global economy, BITs are often used in unstable 
political and economic areas to provide some security for enterprises 
investing in those areas.57 BITs, a new aspect of international law gov-
erning foreign investments, are designed to protect against noncom-
mercial risks accompanying FDI in questionable economic and politi-
cal regimes. 58 
BITs to which the United States is a party differ slightly from 
those of other countries in that they seek not only to create protection 
for enterprises, but also seek to create free access for investments in 
the economy of the other contracting party.59 By entering into a BIT 
with Vietnam, the United States hoped to promote far-reaching 
changes in the Vietnamese economy.60 Specifically, as a result of this 
BIT, the Vietnamese government "has agreed to protect intellectual 
property rights, to accept foreign investment cheerfully, and, as far as 
is possible for a communist dictatorship, to introduce new economic 
and commercial transparency. "61 
The central purpose of the BIT between Vietnam and the United 
States is to increase FDI in Vietnam through the attraction of access to 
the U.S. markets.62 The BIT looks to lower both tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to the Vietnamese economy.63 The agreement drastically low-
ers tariffs on exports from 40% to less than 3%.64 The parties hope 
that such a decrease will spark investments by easing economic barri-
ers to the U.S. markets.65 Some analysts hypothesize that this reduc-
tion could double the already $600 million of exports to the United 
56 Thang, supra note 37. 
57 LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 759 (1993). 
58 ld. 
59 Id. at 765. 
60 Policy/Bus. Outlook, supra note 17. 
61 Pulling Teeth, supra note 3. 
62 Country Forecast Vietnam September 2000 Main Report: Economic Forecast: Economic 
Growth, THE EcoN. INTELLIGENCE UNIT LTD., Sept. 6, 2000, available at 2000 WL 23804920 
[hereinafter Economic Forecast]. 
63 !d. 
64 Pulling Teeth, supra note 3. 
65 Id. 
104 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:97 
States66 The result of this BIT should yield an influx of investment 
into the Vietnamese economy and cause a spill-over effect through 
the accompanying increase in employment, housing purchases, and 
the purchasing of other durable and non-durable goods.67 With little 
doubt, this BIT is a key element in creating a more secure and attrac-
tive market for FDJ.68 
D. Creation of a Vietnamese Stock Exchange 
On July 20, 2000, Vietnam took another major step towards estab-
lishing a more attractive economy for FDI with the opening of its first 
functioning stock exchange.69 Mter four years of preparation and 
numerous delays, the communist governmental regime of Vietnam 
finally fulfilled its commitment to the creation of a public securities 
market.70 
While the objectives of opening the stock exchange are admira-
ble, the actual effect it has and will have on the economy, and espe-
cially on foreign investment, is questionable. 71 Initial trading on the 
exchange has been minimal, mostly consisting of domestic compa-
nies. 72 Furthermore, the number of companies listed, just over 400, is 
minimal. 73 This small quantity, combined with the ceiling that limits 
foreign investors to a combined holding of 20% of any single com-
pany's equity, will result, at least initially, in minimal foreign invest-
ment participation in the market.74 Thus, foreign investment's inter-
est in the stock exchange will be exercised on a "wait-and-see" basis.75 
However, it is important to realize that foreign investment in the 
stock exchange itself is not an immediate concern of the policy-
makers. 76 Their major concern in creating the new Vietnamese Stock 
Exchange is encouraging domestic participation that will strengthen 
66 Id. 
67 HENKIN, supra note 57, at 765. 
68 See, e.g., Pulling Teeth, supra note 3. 
69 Ha Thang, Vietnam Opens 1st Stock Exchange, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REv., July 24, 
2000, availablR at http:/ /www.vir-vietnam.com/ 458vir / 458homOO.htm. 
7o Id. 
71 See generally Nick Freeman, Viet Stock Exchange, Bus. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2000, at 14. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.; see also Strict Regulations to Limit Early Foreign Participation, VIETNAM INVESTMENT 
REv., July 10, 2000, availablR at 2000 WL 9576048 [hereinafter Strict Regulations]. 
75 Strict Regulations, supra note 74. 
76 Freeman, supm note 71. 
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the domestic economy of the country.77 It is important to see the im-
plementation of the stock exchange as one element in Vietnam's at-
tempt to restructure its economic well being.7s 
Ill. SUGGESTED REMEDIES FOR RESTRICTIONS, REGULATIONS, 
AND INFLUENCES THAT CONTINUE TO HINDER THE 
VIETNAMESE EcoNOMY 
While the recent reformation by the Vietnamese government has 
created a more attractive atmosphere for FDI, more must be done to 
create an ideal atmosphere for foreign investment in the Vietnamese 
economy.79 
A. Deregulation of the Phone Utility 
One of the most important changes that must be implemented is 
the deregulation of the phone utility.80 While the change itself seems 
simple, its effects would be substantial.81 International phone charges 
have contributed to relatively high business costs for FDI enterprises 
in Vietnam in comparison with other Asian countries.82 A three-
minute phone call from Vietnam to Japan costs a business $8.52, 
compared to $2.23 that it costs to make the same three-minute phone 
call from Singapore to Japan.83 Such a large discrepancy has led to a 
proposed ten to fifteen percent decrease in international phone 
charges by Vietnam officials.84 This proposal is an important measure 
for Vietnamese officials to pursue because it will help minimize some 
of the unnecessarily high business costs that foreign investors wish to 
avoid.85 
77 !d. 
78 !d. 
79 See Pulling Teeth, supra note 3. 
80 See Vietnam to Reduce International Phone Charges 1Ty 10-15%, VIETNAM INVESTMENT 
REv., Sept. 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 23766004 [hereinafter International Phone 
Charges]. 
81 !d. 
82 !d. 
83 !d. 
84 !d. 
85 See Small Mercies, supra note 27. 
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B. Deregulation of the Banks 
Another major change that must be made in Vietnam in order to 
protect and encourage FDI is deregulation of bank activities.86 Despite 
the fact that FDI investors have minimal access to foreign banks as a 
source of capital, regulation of these banks remains high.87 The qual-
ity and strength of banking regulations have remained stagnant and 
are very difficult to change due to the unbalanced political power of 
the central banking authority vis-a-vis other powerful political inter-
ests. 88 Thus, extremely unfavorable regulations exist that burden both 
foreign banks and foreign business enterprises.89 
One of the major restrictions placed on both banks and enter-
prises seeking the backing of those banks are the restrictive interest 
regulations.90 Even though the restrictions on dong lending rates have 
been removed and positive real rates have taken the place of negative 
ones, these positive changes subsequently have been replaced with 
interest rate bans that limit the banks' flexibility and prevent foreign 
banks from operating on an equal field with domestic banks.91 De-
spite the fact that there has been a significant increase in bank lend-
ing in 1999, further structural change is needed to free capital "fro-
zen" in banks.92 Because of this situation, true market-determinative 
rates are not expected until2004.93 
Finally, some facilitation is needed to aid foreign enterprises in 
their access to sources of capital.94 Access to these markets is ex-
tremely limited and, because of the unyielding regulations, Vietnam-
ese banks are not a viable source of capital.95 
C. Fewer Restrictions on Foreign Influence in the Stock Market 
While the stock exchange is a positive addition to the Vietnamese 
economy and may eventually serve as a source of capital for foreign 
firms, further foreign participation must be encouraged in the near 
86 See Policy/Bus. Outlook, supra note 17. 
87 /d. 
88 /d. 
89 See id. 
90 /d. 
91 Policy/Bus. Outlook, supra note 17. 
92 /d. 
93 /d. 
94 /d. 
95 /d. 
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future. 96 Therefore, there must be some relaxation of the restrictions 
placed on foreign investors seeking to invest in the economy.97 Cur-
rently, foreign investors who seek approval to trade on the Vietnamese 
Stock Exchange must fill out numerous forms and supply many sup-
porting documents.98 These forms exist not only for foreign enter-
prises as they do in the United States, but also for private foreign in-
vestors wishing to purchase stock in separate companies.99 
Further restrictions on the trading capabilities of foreign inves-
tors also threaten to hinder foreign investment in the Vietnamese 
Stock Market.l0° Currently, existing rules do not allow foreign inves-
tors to sell shares for three years if they have taken part in the man-
agement of the company during that period.101 Many believe that the 
three-year period is overly burdensome, even by international stan-
dards, since many jurisdictions have similar restrictions that apply for 
a shorter time frame, usually six months to a year.l02 
CONCLUSION 
While the recent reformation in Vietnam has revived hope for 
the emergence of FDI in the country, further reform is necessary to 
establish a market that is suited to the needs of FDI enterprises. With 
growing deregulation throughout the Asian community, other coun-
tries are quickly becoming viable alternatives for FDI in Asia. The 
Vietnamese government must be careful not to revert to a period of 
isolation from the global economy as a result of infiltration of western 
thought and the decline of communism. While the apprehension is 
reasonable, the truth is that Vietnam's economy is clearly in distress. 
The need for foreign investment is evident, and the suggested 
changes are necessary to aid Vietnam's failing economy. Changes 
such as the deregulation of the phone utility and banks will ease the 
burden of day-to-day business costs and activities. Lower business costs 
and easier access to capital will encourage more foreign companies to 
invest their capital in Vietnam's economy. Furthermore, access to 
Vietnam's Stock Exchange will be a major attraction to foreign busi-
nesses. While foreign access to the stock exchange is an eventual goal, 
96 See Freeman, supra note 71, at 14. 
97 Id. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
1oo See Strict Regulations, supra note 74. 
101 Jd. 
102 See id. 
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it is not a reality in the near future. Deregulation and encouragement 
of further foreign investment in the stock exchange will help 
strengthen its effect on the economy, produce a new source for for-
eign companies to raise capital, and allow Vietnam to become a 
global-market competitor. 
With the increasing centralization of the global economy, FDI is 
an important factor to a successful economy. Vietnam must continue 
to reform its laws and regulations to encourage foreign investment, as 
it has over the past year, and it must not retreat from these reforms as 
it did in the early 1990s. 
